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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-4035 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
LAURENCE T. MCKINNEY, MD,  
         Appellant 
_____________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of  Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 2-09-cr-00234-001 
District Judge: The Honorable Michael M. Baylson 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 14, 2011 
 
Before: SLOVITER, SMITH, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 22, 2011) 
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________ 
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 Laurence T. McKinney, M.D., appeals from his conviction by a jury on 
numerous counts of a forty-nine count indictment charging him with violations of 
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the Controlled Substances Act.  The jury found McKinney guilty of multiple 
counts of distributing Percocet, a Schedule II controlled substance, and Xanax, a  
Schedule IV controlled substance, outside the usual course of professional practice 
and not for a legitimate medical purpose in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 
18 U.S.C. § 2.  In addition, the jury found McKinney guilty of maintaining a place 
for the illegal distribution of controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856.  
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania sentenced 
McKinney to 87 months on the counts alleging the unlawful distribution of the 
Schedule II opiate and the unlawful maintenance of a place to distribute controlled 
substances.  The Court imposed a sentence of 36 months on the remaining counts 
of unlawful distribution of the Schedule IV controlled substance, to be served 
concurrently.  This timely appeal followed.
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 McKinney contends that his conviction should be set aside for several 
reasons.  First, he asserts that the District Court’s jury instructions were prejudicial 
because they blurred the difference between the civil malpractice standard for 
prescribing medication and the proof necessary for a criminal conviction for 
illegally distributing controlled substances.  Second, McKinney argues that the 
District Court erred by allowing the prosecution to admit into evidence a chart that 
                                                 
1
  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise final order 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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summarized data reported to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania regarding the 
number of prescriptions written for Schedule II controlled substances.  Finally, 
McKinney argues that his conviction should be set aside because the prosecution 
failed to disclose two police reports in contravention of the requirements of Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
We conduct plenary review in deciding whether the charge to the jury stated 
the proper legal standard.  United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1245 (3d Cir. 
1995).   In reviewing a District Court’s jury instructions, we consider the charge as 
a whole.  United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1264 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc).  
Because McKinney did not object to the jury instructions, reversal is warranted 
only in the event there is plain error.  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-33 
(1993). 
The authority cited by McKinney demonstrates that the charge could have 
been more comprehensive.  Nonetheless, we conclude that the charge to the jury, 
as a whole, set forth the proper standard.   
McKinney contends that the District Court also erred by allowing the 
prosecution to admit the chart summarizing the contents of the Schedule II/BD-6 
Reports.  We review a District Court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 594 n.40 (3d Cir. 2011).   
We find no abuse as the chart was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 
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1006.  See United States v. Velasquez, 304 F.3d 237, 240 (3d Cir. 2002).  In light 
of the District Court’s limiting instruction regarding the purpose of this chart, we 
reject McKinney’s contention that the chart was unduly prejudicial under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403.   
McKinney’s final argument is that the prosecution committed a Brady 
violation by failing to provide him with two reports by police who responded to 
two incidents at McKinney’s office concerning prescriptions.  Because a Brady 
claim “presents questions of law as well as questions of fact,” we conduct plenary 
review of the legal conclusions and clear error review of any factual findings.  
United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2005).   Because the two 
police reports that were not disclosed were neither material nor exculpatory, we 
conclude that the prosecution did not commit a Brady violation. 
For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
